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as well as its content. The emergence of the cultural/linguistic nation traced in
Mattes’s account may have actually undermined the idea of a common intellectual homeland—it may be that the common intellectual space contained the
seeds of its own downfall and that this period represents the end, not the apex,
of that space. Further exploration of this could have located the book as a seminal intervention on the transatlantic intellectual space. Nevertheless, the book
holds much of interest for scholars of conservatism, the nation, democracy, and
the early republic. It offers vital contextualization of political thought in the early
republic and the development of American democracy. For scholars of the latter areas it is an important text that will have to be taken account of.
Simon Gilhooley, Bard College

Daniel Peart and Adam I. P. Smith, eds. Practicing Democracy: Popular
Politics in the United States from the Constitution to the Civil War. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015. Pp. 296. $49.50.

The United States Constitution was drafted by men who feared and distrusted
political parties. Yet in the 1790s these same framers took the lead in creating
national parties, which in turn became engines of democratization—a development about which those framers were ambivalent. By the 1840s the Democratic and Whig Parties enjoyed a broad national following among ordinary
voters. Martin van Buren, among others, praised parties as forces for sectional
concord in a nation otherwise divided over slavery and other regional interests.
Yet by the late 1850s American voters, disgusted with the political establishment, had killed the Whig Party, fatally divided the Democratic Party, and voted
in large numbers for temperance, nativist, antislavery, and proslavery candidates.
And then the war came.
Like the early Americans they study, the editors and contributors to Practicing Democracy appear ambivalent about political parties. The essays in the
volume are diverse in theme and intellectual approach. What unites them is
common opposition to what the editors label the “oft-repeated narrative,” represented, among others, by Arthur Schlesinger, Walter Dean Burnham, and Joel
Silbey, according to which party competition expands democracy by expanding
electoral participation—that, in short, “party virtually equals democracy” (2, 8).
The contributors to the volume do not dispute that organized party competition increased voter turnout. But they challenge in various ways the notion
that expanded turnout among legally eligible voters is a good indicator of the
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degree to which the American polity was democratic. What matters most, according to Johann N. Neem, is “the actual capabilities of ordinary citizens to
affect outcomes. . . . The more able citizens are to inﬂuence outcomes, the more
democratic the society” (247–48).
In this respect, organized party competition enhanced democracy in some
ways and suppressed it in others. During the Jacksonian era, the two major parties expanded electoral participation by means of “powerful, regimented partisan organizations” that “developed sophisticated means to silence dissent within
their ranks” (65). Rule by party wire-pullers does little to empower ordinary
citizens. But the parties’ capacity to control voters was not unlimited. The creation and ultimate survival of the Democratic and Whig Parties depended on
their remaining responsive to issues voters genuinely cared about. In building
an Illinois Whig Party in the 1830s, for instance, Abraham Lincoln could not
count on strong party attachments but instead emphasized farmers’ access to
credit, “an eminently practical yet profoundly important concern” (154). When
the major parties suppressed issues of urgent concern to millions of voters, as
they did after the Compromise of 1850, voters abandoned the parties.
Contributors to the volume also emphasize the degree to which Americans
who did not possess voting rights, and who therefore had to pressure political
parties from the outside, were often able to shape political outcomes (63–64,
232–33, 251–61). The most dramatic example is the enormous impact of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which was published in installments
in 1851–52 and soon became the best-selling book in American history. John L.
Brooke observes that political historians have often argued that “the northern
public was apathetic about slavery in the years immediately following the Compromise of 1850” (73), only to be aroused from their slumber in 1854 by the
shock of the Kansas–Nebraska Act. Brooke argues that the Kansas–Nebraska
Act triggered a political earthquake only because “the northern public had
been prepared for this moment by a series of events and experiences that fall
outside the purview of routine politics” (79). The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850—
a central theme of Uncle Tom’s Cabin—transformed slavery into “a direct and
palpable experience for northern whites” and gave rise to an enormous sentimental literature sympathetic to the plight of slaves (81–86).
In emphasizing the impact of cultural transformations originating outside
the established parties, the contributors to the volume wisely do not minimize
the importance of political parties and electoral politics. Instead, Neem observes, “parties offered activists a model of how to move from reform into politics. . . . The best evidence we have that the reformers were effective is that the
political system did respond” (261–62). Moreover, Neem acknowledges, “without parties, the will of the people would be too diffuse to gain clear expression,
and voters would be rendered powerless” (264). In this respect the contribu-
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tors to the volume agree with the “oft-repeated narrative” about the connection
between parties and democracy.
Nor does the volume present cultural interventions into politics in a universally positive light. Tyler Ambinder’s chapter on “Immigrants and Popular Politics in Pre–Civil War New York” reminds one of Martin Scorsese’s ﬁlm Gangs
of New York. Irish immigrants effectively controlled New York City politics by,
among other tactics, joining volunteer ﬁre companies, one of whose duties was
to put out political ﬁres by packing political meetings and polling places and
forcibly ejecting dissenters (201–4).
The contributors to the volume challenge not only the substance of the partiesentail-democracy thesis but also the chronology of that narrative. Simplifying
somewhat, the received narrative (which the authors here associate with Arthur
Schlesinger) is that politics during the founding era was a gentleman’s occupation, infused with some popular ferment during the 1790s, then sinking into
low-participation torpor by 1820. But beginning in 1828, the story goes, Andrew
Jackson appealed to the common man, attacked the national bank, polarized
the electorate, spawned mass political parties, and ushered in the age of (white
male) egalitarian democracy.
The volume acknowledges that in many states popular apathy reigned in the
early 1820s after the disappearance of party competition; in Richmond, Virginia,
the state capital, only 17 votes were cast in the 1820 presidential election, and
nationwide only about 10% of eligible voters turned out. But in 1824 in Illinois,
where party competition was likewise absent, 83% of the electorate turned out
for a referendum in which a proposal to make Illinois a slave state was decisively
defeated. Thus, critically important issues could turn out voters with or without organized parties (130–38). In Virginia voter turnout was higher in the late
1790s, during the contest over the Alien and Sedition Acts, than it ever became
during the Jacksonian era (106). Though organized two-party competition and
extensive popular mobilization did not become a national phenomenon before
the late 1830s, in some places it appeared much earlier (46–47).
This excellent volume does includes some occasional false notes. Douglas
Bradburn speaks inaccurately of James Madison’s “desire to organize a majority faction in opposition to Hamilton” (32). Madison did not view himself
as organizing a faction, even if his critics charged him with doing so. Madison distinguished between just and unjust majorities; he called only the latter
a faction. Alexander Hamilton, reﬂecting on the weaknesses of the Constitution, referred to his efforts to prop up a “frail and worthless fabric” (Alexander
Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, February 1802, in The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton, ed. Harold Syrett [New York: Columbia University Press, 1977],
25:544); he did not call the Constitution a “frail and worthless document,”
as incorrectly quoted here (29).
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But the volume as a whole is well written, richly detailed, interesting to read,
and more thematically coherent than most edited volumes. The authors and
editors never lose focus on the following questions: Why should we care whether
parties are strong or weak, or whether electoral participation rises or falls? How
are such indicators connected with the capacity of ordinary citizens to shape
political life? Do political parties bind a nation together or deepen its divides?
Those are key questions for understanding antebellum American political history. They remain important questions today.
James H. Read, College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University

Gary Gerstle. Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government, from the Founding to the Present. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015. Pp 492. $35.00.

Gary Gerstle’s compelling new book is about political improvisation. It tells
the story of how the United States managed to extend its “laws, institutions,
and sovereignty across a vast continent” even though unable to rely on “a large
centralized state” (345). The small government grew, we learn, by way of subtle forms of creative and imaginative politics.
Gerstle’s journey begins with the federation of the late 1780s, when the republic embraced a liberal Constitution and instituted a central power, but one
so “internally fragmented among three different branches of government” as to
guarantee that “no single person, clique, or agency in the central state would ever
be able to accumulate the sort of control” gathered by George III in Britain (21).
American liberalism was, after all, no simple copy of its European counterpart.
Even before the Revolution broke out, Gerstle argues, Americans had gradually come to ground ‘membership’ in their polity on residence and free will
rather than on birth or descent in order to construct the “notion of a republic
by consent” (30–32). This was new enough. But Americans were also ﬁlled with
nostalgia for a republican ideal on the model of ancient Rome and had enjoyed
a long history of local autonomy, which convinced them that the republican
model could be successfully practiced. Indeed, since the earliest colonial days,
local assemblies had acted as sovereign entities informally exercising the royal
prerogative, which implied “the due regulation and domestic order” of their
states (59–60). And so the quasi-sovereign attributes of the former colonies created a suitable environment for the pursuit of the republican dream of a polity
empowered to ensure the ‘common good’.
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